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PATHWAYS TO CORPORATE CONVERGENCE? TWO STEPS ON
THE ROAD TO SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM IN GERMANY

Jeffrey N. Gordon*

INTRODUCTION

One of the most interesting current debates in corporate law is whether
worldwide corporate governance will ultimately converge on a single model in
light of the increasing globalization of capital markets, and if so, whether it will
be an Anglo-American model whose features are shaped by the shareholder
primacy norm. Convergence skeptics have focused on the embeddedness of
governance systems in national political structures that tend to protect both
entrenched insider interests and non-shareholder constituencies against the
incursions of Anglo-American governance agendas.' Convergence optimists have
focused on the evolutionary pressures of competitive international capital
markets2 and on the tendency of firms that seek to achieve global scale to opt
into high-quality securities market regulatory regimes that will promote
transparency, accountability and shareholder fiduciary protection. 3 While not
subscribing to the inevitability of convergence, I think there is another
convergence route that will become increasingly influential: the cross-border
acquisition. Important factors include the intensifying pace of cross-border
acquisition activity generally; 4 the increasing economic integration of
"Euroland" following the introduction of the Europan common currency;5 and
the ubiquity of common stock as an acquisition currency, if only because of the
sheer size of the transactions. Cross-border stock mergers will thus frequently
* Alfred W. Bressler Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. The author gratefully
acknowledges the generosity of the Robert Bosch Stiftung in funding the symposium at which this
Article was presented. Many thanks for comments by symposium participants and participants of the
University of Michigan Law and Economics Workshop, especially Meit Fox.
I See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance (forthcoming Stan. L. Rev. 1999); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in
Firms, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1145 (1998).
2 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakmann, The End of History for Corporate Law
(Columbia Sloan Project Conference on Convergence in Corporate Governance: The Emerging
Questions, Nov. 17, 1997).
3 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and its Implications, Columbia Univ. Center for Law and Economics Working
Paper No.144 (Nov. 11, 1998).
1 See Cross-Border M&A, 33 Mergers & Acquisitions 56 (1999).
5 See Garrick Holmes, A Vintage Year for European M&A: Deregulation and the Imminence of
Unification Drove the Deal Flow, 33 Mergers & Acquisitions 16 (1999).
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trigger an influx of new shareholders who may have different governance
traditions and expectations and who may now be especially concerned to ensure
that shareholder interests are protected in the system they have been merged
into. The new influence may change the governance landscape not only in the
cross-border case but may help establish a "best practice" model that influences
other local firms. This article explores this hypothesis in the context of two
transactions that push the limits of shareholder capitalism in Germany-the
privatization of Deutsche Telekom and the merger of Chrysler and DaimlerBenz.
I.

SHAREHOLDER CULTURE IN GERMANY

One of the major recent objectives of German economic policymakers has
been the promotion of a shareholding culture among German citizens. There is
apparently widespread sentiment among political actors that the system of bankcentered finance is hindering German economic development, giving rise to the
desire to develop stock market channels for equity finance. Initial public
offerings historically have been rare in Germany--only 10 in all of 1994, and
the stock markets are famously illiquid 6 and volatile. 7 Among other things, this
makes it difficult to imitate the U.S. pattern of high tech development in which
venture capital specialists nurture a startup with an eye toward a lucrative exit
via an initial public offering.' Banks are not seen as very effective in performing
6 In 1994, just three companies-Deutsche Bank AG, Daimler-Benz, and Siemens AG, accounted
for one third of the volume in German public markets; the top six finns accounted for almost 50%.
Peter Gumbel, Cracking the German Market: The Hard Sell: Getting Germans to Invest in Stocks,
Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1995, at A4. There were 810 publicly traded firms in 1994. Firms ranked 50 to
810 accounted for less than 12% of volume. Hartmut Schmidt et al., Corporate Governance in
Germany 59 (1997).
7 See generally Stefan Prigge, A Survey of German Corporate Governance, in Klaus Hopt et al.,
Comparative Corporate Governance-The State of the Art and Emerging Research 943, 998-90
(1998).
During the 1980-88 period, there were 96 German initial public offerings, only 51 of which were
on the principal, or "Official" market. By contrast, 764 British firms went public in that period, 284
on the Official Market. See Marc Goergen, Insider Retention and Long-Run Performance in German
and UK IPOs (UMIST School of Management Working Paper, Dec.7, 1998) (on file with the
author).
Over the period 1975-1995 the approximate ratio of average annual nominal returns to risk
(standard deviation) on German equity markets was 8.6%/18%. See Charles Olivier, Unlocking
Germany's $200 Billion Corporate Pension Pot, Euromoney, June 1996; Euromoney Survey,
Germany, Equities, Euromoney, June 1996 at 6, tbl. 4. By contrast, German investors can earn a
nominal yield of 7-8% on a portfolio of government bonds and local mortgage bonds, with risk
below 6%. See Olivier, supra.
8 See Bernard S. Black and Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. Fin. Econ. 243, 246-52 (1998) (comparing venture
capital markets in the U.S. and Germany); Wolfgang Gerke, Market Failure in Venture Capital
Markets for New Medium and Small Enterprises, in Hopt et al., supra note 7, at 607.
Very recently there has been more interest in high-tech IPOs, fostered in Germany by the
development of an alternative to the official Frankfurt stock exchange, the so-called "Neuer Markt."
See Edmund L. Andrews, A European Infatuation: Investors Aglow Over Entrepreneurs, N.Y. Times,
June 5, 1998, at DI.
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the venture capital role, so a shareholder culture might make possible alternative
modes of finance for potential sources of innovation and growth. 9
Moreover, the Grossbanken, in particular, have lost credibility as monitors of
managerial performance. The failures have been spectacular: Daimler-Benz, in
which Deutsche Bank supported the company's costly move into extensive
unrelated diversification in the late 1980's (just at the time when the US
takeover market was at high boil in the effort to undo prior decades of unrelated
diversification); Metallgesellschaft, which showed a glaring failure to monitor
the financial risks of commodities trading, presumably an area in which a bank
would have some special sensitivity; the collapse of the real estate empire of
Jirgen Schneider, in which escalating bad loans suggested in-group bank
myopia; and Kl6ckner-Humboldt-Deutz, in which a longstanding accounting
fraud remained hidden from a Deutsche Bank-led restructuring of the firm only
two years earlier.' 0 Apart from these highly visible events, there have also been
a number of academic studies that challenge the efficacy of bank monitoring."
Thus, the development of a shareholding culture carries some idea of injecting
new voices in the monitoring of German management and, even more
importantly, shifting the focus of finance and governance away from creditor
claimants to equity claimants.
The question, of course, is what has stood in the way of the development of
German equity capital markets? Is it culture? If so, does that mean, possibly,
that the demand for equities is low because Germans are leery of risk-taking and
therefore equity would be sold at a discount to "intrinsic" value. Or possibly,
culture imposes constraints on the supply side-the family owners of potential
public firms are reluctant to make public disclosure of "private" matters and
perhaps jeopardize the private benefits of control. The cultural story might be
situated in Germany's particular history in the 20th century, including the
development of a strong trade union movement that represents workers in
national-level political negotiations as well as company-specific bargaining.
It could also be institutional, meaning that the German legal regime inhibits
the growth of equity securities markets. For example, Germany is classified as a
I See Wendy Carlin and Colin Mayer, Finance, Investment and Growth (University College,
London, and Said Business School, Oxford Working Paper, Oct. 18, 1998) (on file with the author)
(using data from 20 OECD countries in 27 industries, 1970-95, to find that relations between
financial structure and economic activity come through research and development ("R&D")

expenditures rather than fixed capital formation); Stanley W. Black and Mathias Moersch, Financial
Structure, Investment and Economic Growth in OECD Countries, in Competition and Convergence
in Financial Markets 169-70 (1998) (robustness of stock market as predictor of R&D expenditures)
(hereinafter "Competition and Convergence").
l0 Some of these failures are described with particular vigor in Ekkehard Wenger and Christoph
Kaserer, The German System of Corporate Governance-A Model Which Should Not Be Imitated,
in Competition and Convergence, supra note 9, at 41-78; Ekkehard Wenger and Christoph Kaserer,
German Banks and Corporate Governance-A Critical View, in Hopt et al., supra note 7, at 499; see
also Recent Scandals Place German Boards Under Attack, 13 Inv. Resp. Res. Center Corp. Gov.
Bull. 16 (July-Sept. 1996).
n The debate is summarized in Hartmut Schmidt et al., Corporate Governance in Germany 14162, 244-46 (1997).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. 5

country without a robust tradition of fiduciary duty protection of the interests of
minority stockholders. 2 Controlling shareholders are relatively free to diverge
from a pro rata distribution of enterprise cash flows, for example, through onesided transfer pricing arrangements with affiliated companies, or asset sales on
favorable terms to affiliates. The risk of such opportunism hinders the
development of stock markets in a number of different ways. First, noncontrolling shares will be valued at a discount to account for the risk, meaning
that faithful owners will suffer dilution in a public sale, thus reducing the
desirability of going public. This is a classic "lemons" problem. Second, owners
cannot avoid the financial penalty simply by selling control into the market,
because of the arbitrage opportunity thereby created for a subsequent control
entrepreneur to reassemble a control block. This means the lemons problem may
be difficult to solve. Third, the most effective way to reduce the opportunism
risk may be through a pattern of private cross-holdings, a form of mutual
hostage-taking that uses private transactions to gain some of the benefits of
diversification and capital raising that might otherwise be the attractions of an
initial public offering.
Another element of the German legal landscape that may inhibit the growth of
stock markets is codetermination, whose most salient characteristic is the
creation of a second or "supervisory board" that chooses members of the
"managing board" and has final say on other important corporate matters. The
supervisory board is divided between representatives of shareholders and
employees, although in a direct conflict the chair can be counted upon to break
a tie in favor of the shareholders. Many believe that codetermination has
13
undermined the potential monitoring capacity of the German board.
Supervisory boards are unwieldy---commonly twenty seats. The desire to avoid
revealing information to employee representatives means that supervisory board
members typically receive much less information than American public company
directors. Also, supervisory boards meet infrequently, normally four times a year
or less. The result is a double negative for the development of public securities
markets. First, a structurally inadequate board increases the risk of high agency
costs in a public firm. These costs will be borne by an owner in a public
offering and such a governance discount will reduce the attractiveness of going
public. Second, the complementary institution that has grown up to ameliorate
some of these governance costs, Grossbanken monitoring, helps foster a form of
insider control that conflicts with a full sense of shareholder capitalism. Because
in most cases the bank's interest as creditor (or potential creditor) dominates its
stockholder interest, its monitoring decisions will be conflicting. 14 Moreover, the
Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997).
See e.g., Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 1998 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 167 (1998); Katharina Pistor, Co-Determination in Germany: A Socio-Political Model
with Governance Externalities, in Corporate Governance Today 377 (Columbia Sloan Project
Conference Volume, 1998).
14 See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial
Banking: A Comparative Analysis of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 73
(1995).
12
13
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quality and direction of monitoring is undermined by the concentration of the
bank role among a small number of institutions that are themselves interlocked
through ownership and monitoring relationships.
The consequence of these cultural or institutional factors is to reduce the
breadth of German stock markets. This is illustrated by the disparity between the
total stock market capitalization and the size of the economy in Germany
relative to other OECD countries where equity plays a more important role. For
instance, stock market capitalization is 17% of the Gross Domestic Product
("GDP") in Germany as compared to 132% of the GDP in Great Britain."5 The
further consequence is a form of corporate governance in public firms in which
non-insider public shareholders have little voice and little chance to influence
governance outcomes.
Indeed, the basic pattern of share ownership in German companies is quite
different from the Anglo-American model most closely identified with
shareholder capitalism. The most complete study of German public companies,
taking account of new data made available by 1994 implementing legislation for
the European Union Transparency Directive, reveals a remarkable degree of
concentration.1 6 For 430 public firms reporting any level of blockownership in
1996, the median level is 77%, which equals 47% of the value of publiclytraded equity. For the entire sample, the median number of blockholders in a
firm was two; for industrial firms, one. Not surprisingly, larger firms tend to
have more blockholders. Most parties report owning only a single large block,
but banks, insurance companies, and a small number of industrial enterprises
own more than ten each. In turn, there is an extensive pattern of cross-ownership
among these top blockholders. 17 Moreover, it bears repetition that a relatively
small percentage of German firms are publicly-traded, particularly the nonfinancial finms. Observers commonly believe that these are family-controlled
enterprises that may be linked to other firms through cross-holdings.
As noted above, various German elites believe that this particular pattern of
ownership and control can undermine Germany's long-term economic position
'5 See Euromoney Survey, Germany, Equities, Euromoney, June 1996, at tbl. I (For 1995, 24%
for Germany, 131% for Great Britain). These comparisons apparently reflect the relatively small
number of German firms that are publicly traded more than the debt-equity ratio throughout German
business.
16 Ekkehart Boehmer, Who Controls Germany? An Exploratory Analysis, (University of
OsnabrUck Institut fiir Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, Working Paper No. 71, 1998). Because of
legislative loopholes that lead to under-reporting of ownership blocks, these figures probably
understate large blockholder ownership. Boehmer's findings are consistent with other studies on
blockownership. For example, for a 1991 sample of 558 listed firms, 90% had a blockowner holding
more than 25% of the equity; 72% had a blockowner holding more than 50% of the equity. See
Ulrich Hommel, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: Lesson from Germany, 2 Int'l J. Bus.
101, 103 (1998). To similar effect are Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, Corporate Ownership and
Control in the U.K., Germany, and France, in Studies in International Corporate Finance and
Governance Systems 281 (Donald H. Chew ed., 1997); Schmidt, supra note 6 at 62-70.
17 For private firms, which represent the bulk of the Germany economy, there seems to be no
generally available information on ownership structure, but it is hard to believe that shareownership
in such firms is less concentrated.
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because of the association between robust capital markets and new entrants,
especially in the technology area. Capital market development was seen as one
solution to the high unemployment economic malaise of Germany in the 1990's.
One bold step to jumpstart a shareholding culture was the privatization of
Deutsche Telekom, the state telephone monopoly. In my view, in the eagerness
to assure wide distribution of Deutsche Telekom shares to the German public,
the transaction planners insulated the purchasers from the key elements of equity
investment: risk and significant governance rights. In that sense, if the goal was
to introduce citizens to serious stock ownership, the transaction may have sent
the wrong cultural signal.
Nevertheless, shareholder capitalism may come to Germany through an
entirely different route: the merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Corporation,
the world's largest cross-border merger of two industrial corporations. One of
the striking elements of the transaction structure is that the resulting business
entity will be a German corporation. DaimlerChrysler has listed on the New
York Stock Exchange and will file reports consistent with United States
accounting rules, but its corporate governance regime will be German. Some
shareholder activists may view this development with alarm because of the
notable ways that the German system apparently subordinates shareholder
interests. More closely examined, however, German corporate law is surprisingly
open to American-style shareholder activism. Therefore, it is likely that the
German takeover of a U.S. corporation will lead to a substantial injection of
American-style shareholder capitalism. Because of DaimlerChrysler's sheer
importance to the Germany economy, the corporate governance norms that
develop there may resonate throughout German firms generally. The convergence
literature contrasts international capital market pressures toward governance
against the counter pressure of path-dependent institutions and payoff structures.
I believe cross-border mergers add a new element to this debate. In pursuing
scale economies, these cross-border transactions also abruptly change
shareownership patterns; the interaction of different corporate governance
cultures may produce surprising new syntheses.
The ultimate question is whether shareholder capitalism is something Germany
"wants." The German corporate governance system is famed for its concern for
stakeholder interests, particularly employees. The formal and informal resistance
to layoffs has been part of a system of highly firm-specific human capital
investment, that until relatively recently has produced stellar economic
performance. The "failings" of the Deutsche Telekom privatization may be by
design. The dispersal of share ownership creates a Berle-Means firm in which
management is relatively free from shareholder pressure. It advances a vision of
"shareholder culture" without "shareholder primacy." By contrast, the
DaimlerChrysler transaction could well establish a model for a German version
of shareholder capitalism that would expose managers to a new level of capital
market pressure to perform for shareholders which would be far more disruptive
of established patterns of governance and political economy.
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H.

THE DEUTSCHE TELEKOM TRANSACTION

In November, 1996, Deutsche Telekom Aktiengesellschaft (DT), the
government-owned German telephone company, sold common stock representing
approximately 25% of the company in a global stock offering that raised
approximately DM 20 billion (US $13 billion), the largest equity offering ever in
Europe."8 In selling off this equity stake, the German government had a number
of motives. First, the sale was an important step in converting a government-run
telephone monopoly into a nimble competitor in the emerging European and
world telecommunications market. In anticipation of a fully competitive
European telecommunications regime by 1998, DT was separated out from the
Deutsche Bundespost--Germany's postal, telephone, and telegraph authority-as
a private law stock corporation owned 100% by the government.' 9 Sale of the
initial 25% tranche was the first stage of an eventual privatization of the entire
company. At the time of the offering, DT's outstanding debt was approximately
DM 110 billion (US $73 billion), and a significant objective of the sale was to
recapitalize the company. During the fifteen months following October 1996,
approximately DM 16 billion of debt was to come due, bearing an average
interest of 6.6%, which management intended to replace with the new equity.
Second, the sale was also part of an effort to establish an entrepreneurial
culture at DT. This meant downsizing the workforce, from 230,000 at year-end,
1994, to a targeted 170,000 by 2000 (through traditional German means of
attrition and early retirement rather than layoffs), and reorganizing the business
on functional lines. Iii addition, approximately 3.3% of the offering-nearly 1%
of the company's equity-was sold to employees under various preferential
arrangements designed to "increase employee identification" 2 0 with the
company, a particular challenge since nearly half the workforce are tenured civil
service employees whose salaries and benefits are set by government regulation.
Another major goal of the privatization was to promote a German shareholder
culture. This was reflected in the vigor with which the offering was marketed to
the German public. Although the transaction was a "global offering," two thirds
was eventually allocated to German investors and institutions, approximately
40% of the total going to retail purchasers. More than three million retail

IS

Deutsche Telekom AG, Prospectus for the Offering of 85,000,000 Ordinary Shares in the form

of American Depositary Shares, at 104, Nov. 17, 1996 (hereinafter, "DT Prospectus") (on file with
author). As this article goes to press, May 1, 1999, Deutsche Telekom is a possible "white knight"
for Telecom Italia against a hostile bid launched by Olivetti. Among the possible roadblocks to the
DT offer is the post-privatization ownership position of the German government.

19The process of restructuring began in 1989 with legislation that separated the three main
activities of the Bundespost-telecommunications, postal services, and financial services-into
distinct businesses and contemplated their privatization. Gesetz zur Neustrukturierung des Post- und
Fernmeldewesens und der Deutschen Bundespost [PostStruktG], v. 8.6.1989 (BGBI. I. S. 2325)
("Postreform I").
10 DT Prospectus, supra note 18, at 1. See Hans-Willi Hefekauser, Die Deutsche Telekom AGVon der 6ffentlich-rechtlichen zur privatrechtlichen Zielsetzung in Unternehmen der 6ffentlichen
Hand, 25 Zeitschrift fiir
Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht [ZGR] 385 (David Blass trans., 1996)
(on file with author).
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investors signed up to get information on the issue, and the offering was several
times oversubscribed.
Nevertheless, the Deutsche Telekom offering seems an unlikely preparation for
a shareholding culture. Indeed, it may undermine one, both because it replicates
public shareholder passivity and sets unrealistic standards for stability of value.
The DT initial public offering is, of course, only a partial privatization; the
government held on to 74%, making it the dominant shareholder. Under the
Stock Corporation Law of 1965 (Aktiengesetz),21 a 50% holder has the power to
elect all the shareholder representatives of the supervisory board 22 and controls
the disposition of all other routine matters that come before the shareholders
meeting, 23 including ratification of the acts of the management board and the
supervisory board. 24 A 75% holder has distinctive powers, including the right to
recall a member of the supervisory board, 25 and the right to amend the articles
of incorporation. 26 Many of these powers are subject to alternative specification
in the articles, but the DT articles do not provide for any such limitation.
Many aspects of the transaction assure that the government will remain the
dominant holder for a substantial period of time, and that management is
substantially entrenched. 27 The privatization legislation restricts the government
from further public stock sales until 2000, in order to give DT priority on public
market access. Under pressure to meet the Maastricht budgetary criteria for
Economic and Monetary Union, the government subsequently decided to sell off
a 25% stake in DT to the state development loan agency, Kreditanstaltfar
Wiederaujbau, which will eventually place the shares with "strategic investors,"
including potential international business partners, but not until 2000.28 Even
after this sale, issuance by DT of all of the remaining authorized but unissued
shares would still leave the government a 44% holder. Supervisory board
members were elected upon DT's formation in 1995; their five year terms will
extend until 2000. The government also agreed to give the management board a
veto over its sale of shares to "strategic investors." 29 Moreover, the availability
of a DM 0.50 per share discount for German retail investors is conditioned on
purchase through a bank account, making it likely that "public" share ownership
has been folded into the bank's proxy voting system. Thus, certainly in the short
term, DT is unlikely to present the occasion for significant public shareholder
involvement in serious governance or control questions.
See
22 See
23 See
24 See
21

25

generally, Aktiengesetz (AktG).
§§ 101, 119 AktG.
§§ 119, 133 AktG.
§ 120(1), (2) AktG.

See § 103(1) AktG.

26See § 179(1), (2) AktG.
27 The government's shares are held by the Federal Institute, which appears to comprise the
administrative apparatus of the Post Ministry.
28 Following Postreform I which separated the three main activities of the Bundesposttelecommunications, postal services, and financial services-into distinct businesses, the second
reform act, in 1994, made all three services private stock corporations. Gesetz zur Neuordnung des
Postwesens und der Telekommunikation ("Postreform II").
29 DT Prospectus, supra note 18, at 18.
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The offer has a number of unusual features designed to encourage and sustain
widespread public ownership. First, the economics have been shaped in a way
that will minimize, at least in the short term, the volatility often associated with
equity ownership. In connection with the offering, DT announced that it
expected to pay a 2% dividend in 1997 and a 4% dividend in 1998 (measured
against the offering price),30 a somewhat remarkable undertaking for a company
in the midst of a fundamental business change. A substantial part of DT's
business is the monopoly provision of public fixed-link voice telephony, which
will be regulated by a new administrative agency, the Regulatory Authority for
Telecommunications and Post ("Regulatory Authority").3 A prospective
shareholder could well find in these dividend arrangements an implicit promise
that the Regulatory Authority will set a rate structure so as to permit payment of
a regular dividend regardless of the profitability of DT's other business
activities.
The offer also contains special incentives for widespread share ownership, a
DM 0.50 discount for share purchases up to 300 shares and a special 1/10 share
bonus for shares continuously held for three years after the initial public offering
(up to thirty bonus shares). This incentive is presumably based on the experience
of the Volkswagen privatization in the 1960's, in which public investors bought
shares at a discount and promptly resold them. Finally, the stock exchange was
pressured to give DT a disproportionate weighting in the DAX-30, which will
help support the price and liquidity of the offering.3 2 All of these extra elements
were designed to make the offering successful, at least through the medium
term. This result has been achieved, in part because of favorable macroeconomic
conditions in Germany and Europe. The stock has generally traded at a premium
over the initial public offering (IPO) price. As of October, 1998, the gain was
approximately 50% on a total return basis, a very substantial two year return.
The partial privatization was successful, but the explicit and tacit assurances of
dividend protection and the ownership and governance structure are far from a
robust version of shareholder capitalism.
Ill.

THE MERGER OF CHRYSLER AND DAIMLER-BENZ

The DaimlerChrysler merger is an odd combination of the spectacular and the
ordinary. It is the largest industrial merger ever (at least in absolute value) and
thus it is the largest cross-border industrial merger ever. Integrating an enterprise
so vast, whose components have distinct cultural roots, is a substantial business
challenge. Yet the contemplated synergies and economies are in the standard
M&A playbook. The proxy statement sent to Chrysler shareholders estimated
benefits of US $1.4 billion in the first year of combined operation and US $3
billion within three to five years, "based not on plant closings or lay-offs, but
on such factors as shared technologies, distribution, purchasing and know30 DT Prospectus, supra note 18, at 15-16.
31 § 66 Telekommunikationsgesetz [TkG], v. 1.8.1996 (BGB1. I S. 1120).
32 Laura Covill, Telekom Rules OK, Euromoney, January 1997. The Stock Exchange Committee

was persuaded to weight the full amount of Deutsche Telekom's capital, not just the public float.
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how."' 33 The combined entity will produce vehicles across the full range of
consumer tastes, from the luxury Mercedes to Jeeps, minivans, and trucks, to the
economy Neon. Comparative geographic and manufacturing strengths can be
exploited even if plants and showrooms for the Mercedes and the various
Chrysler automobiles remain separate. Chrysler expects much higher penetration
into the European car market after the merger, and the companies can cooperate
in emerging markets in Latin America and Asia. 34 The two companies may
cooperate on new products, such as minivans, where Chrysler has significant
experience. There are some obvious cost-cutting potentials: elimination of
overlapping research in advanced technology areas such as fuel cells, electric
cars, advanced diesel engines (Daimler is dominant); adoption of Chrysler-style
supplier-relationships and purchasing; and consolidation of back office
functions.35
Unlike the Deutsche Telekom transaction, the DaimlerChrysler merger was not
aimed at promoting a German shareholder culture, but that may be one of its
most important consequences. There are three basic reasons. First, the merger
pioneered a transactional form that will make it easier for German firms to
engage in cross-border combinations that dilute German shareownership and
bring in shareholders with potentially different governance expectations. Insofar
as such transactions dilute the control position of German banks and other
blockholders, the "inside" governance strategies that have held managers
accountable may become less effective and that may in turn open the way for
"outside" strategies of greater public shareholder activism. Second, the
DaimlerChrysler merger proposes the governance innovation of a third board, a
so-called "Integration Committee" consisting principally of the stockholder
representatives on the DaimlerChrysler supervisory board that will advise the
Management Board "in connection with the combined businesses and
operations" of the company. 36 This could bring shareholder pressure on the
Management Board without the infirmities that have hampered operation of the
Supervisory Board. Third, the changing ownership pattern may permit
shareholders to use the suprisingly flexible German corporate law to establish
new governance norms. Innovations that are established in so visible a company
as DaimlerChrysler may disseminate more widely.
33 Chrysler Corporation Proxy Statement/DaimlerChrysler AG Prospectus, Aug. 6, 1998, at 51,
(hereinafter, "DC Proxy Statement/Prospectus") (http://www.sec.Archives/edgar/data/1067318/
0001047469-98-029563.txt) (visited Feb. 24, 1999).
3 See Brian Coleman, DaimlerChrysler Says It's Considering Developing a Low-priced Sedan for
Asia, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1998, at A4.
35 See Gregory L. White and Brian Coleman, Chrysler, Daimler Focus on Value of Stock, Wall St.
J., Sept. 21, 1998, at A3; Angelo B. Henderson, DaimlerChrysler to Be 'Transnational,' Not
American or German, Says Eaton, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1998, at B9; Steven Lipin and Brandon
Mitchener, Daimler-Chrysler Merger to Produce $3 Billion in Savings, Revenue Gains Within 3 to 5
Years, Wall St. J., May 8, 1998, at A10; Tony Jackson, Culture Curcial to Synergy Equation, Fin.
Times (London), May 8, 1998, at 28; Gentleman, Start Your Engines: Daimler Benz's Schrempp and
Chrysler's Eaton Discuss Their Deal and the Auto Industry's Future, Fortune, June 8, 1998, at 138.
3 DC Proxy Statement/Prospectus, supra note 31 at 66.
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A New TransactionalForm

The threshold question is why DaimlerChrysler was organized as a German
corporation. There seem to have been two important reasons. First, under
German law, a combination in which a non-European Union corporation (such
as a Delaware corporation) was the survivor would have triggered capital gain
recognition for Daimler's shareholders. In particular, Deutsche Bank would have
been forced to recognize gain on its 25% stake, which it acquired in the mid1970's. Second, using a tax-preferred jurisdiction (such as the Netherlands)
would not have been politically acceptable. Daimler is, after all, Germany's
largest corporation, and the work force would have resisted the loss of
codetermination that would have followed shifting the "seat" of incorporation
outside Germany.
Deciding that the combined entity should be a German Aktiengesellschaft
(AG) did not resolve the parties' transactional planning problems because the
legality of cross-border mergers is uncertain under the German Transformation
37
Act (Umwandlungsgesetz), which purports to apply only to domestic firms.
Under the Act, mergers must be published in the commercial registry to become
effective; in some cases, the court administering the registry has refused to
accept cross-border transactions, not because they are illegal, but because they
are not specifically permitted. 8 This degree of uncertainty would simply be
intolerable for the merger of large public corporations.
There were additional problems for the transaction planners under German
corporate law. The parties wanted to retain Chrysler as a separate U.S. corporate
entity, presumably to protect contractual rights and perhaps for better U.S.
regulatory treatment of U.S. operations. The convenient transactional form under
U.S. law, a reverse triangular merger, is not permitted under German law.39 The
alternative, in which Chrysler shares could be received as a "contribution in
kind" in exchange for Daimler shares, 40 was vulnerable to litigation-related
delay. The authorization of additional Daimler shares required shareholder
approval and registration of the share issuance in the appropriate commercial
registry. Any shareholder could bring a lawsuit, an "annulment action,"
challenging the bona fides of the new issuance, which could lead to
4
postponement of the registration until final disposition of the matter. '
As a solution to these problems the parties used a corporation, call it Newco
AG, established (and owned) by a private bank, Oppenheim, as a transaction
vehicle. Chrysler shareholders were to make an in-kind contribution of their
31 In this discussion I am following Theodor Baums, Corporate Contracting Around Defective
Regulations: the Daimler-Chrysler Case, (University of Osnabrick Institut fur Handels- und
Wirtschaftsrecht, Working Paper No. 68, 1998). See also Deal Spotlight: A Closer Look at ChryslerDaimler, 15 Corp. Control Alert no. 7, at 8-10 (July/Aug. 1998).
38 Baums, supra note 37, at n. 6 (citing M. Lutter ed., Unwandlungsgesetz (UmwG), § 1, margin
no. 5, n. 8).
39 Id., at 7.
40 See §§ 183, 185 AktG.
41 See §§ 186, 184, 243, 245, 255 AktG; Baums, supra note 37 at 8.
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42
shares in exchange for shares in Newco (renamed DaimlerChrysler AG).
Oppenheim's 100% prior ownership of Newco assured the necessary
cooperation. The ultimate combination of Daimler into DaimlerChrysler had two
stages, an exchange offer followed by a merger. This was done because a direct
merger of Daimler into DaimlerChrysler would have given dissenting Daimler
shareholders the German equivalent of an appraisal remedy (Spruchverfahren) in
which any "improvement" over the negotiated exchange ratio would have been
paid out in cash to all shareholders, not just the dissenters. Therefore, the first
step was an exchange offer to Daimler shareholders in which the closing
condition was a minimum 80% acceptance, followed by the second step merger.
This brought the economic risk associated with the Spruchverfahren to
manageable levels.
The parties had an additional powerful reason to push for a 90% acceptance
rate: to qualify for "pooling" treatment under U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Practices (GAAP) and thereby avoid the need to recognize and
amortize goodwill. Daimler shareholders were offered a slightly sweetened
exchange ratio if the43 90% level was reached, and indeed, 97% agreed to
exchange their shares.
Thus, one important contribution of the DaimlerChrysler merger was to
establish a powerful legal precedent for cross-border mergers under German law.
Such transactions have the potential to bring in at one time a large group of
shareholders with different corporate governance expectations, particularly the
importance of shareholder value as the touchstone of managerial decisionmaking.
For example, immediately after consummation of the DaimlerChrysler merger,
U.S. shareholders held 44% of the outstanding "ordinary" stock, Germans only
37%.44 The transactions also significantly diluted the ownership stake of
traditional German owners. Deutsche Bank's ownership stake in
DaimlerChrysler, for example, will be diluted to 13%.
Because of Standard & Poor's decision to exclude DaimlerChrysler from its
benchmark S&P 500 index as a foreign issuer, at least some U.S. institutions
have moved out of the stock, reducing the U.S. ownership percentage to
approximately 25%. 41 Nevertheless, there is no reason to think that ownership
will revert to the passive system of bank proxy voting that protected
management. The development of European-wide stock markets and market
indices following the introduction of the Euro and the growth of Europe-focused
asset managers as part of multinational investment banks is likely to produce a
group of institutional investors with expectations similar to those of U.S.
institutions.

42 This followed a merger of Chrysler into a U.S. merger sub, which put all of Chrysler's shares
in the hands of a trustee for purposes of the in-kind contribution. See DC Proxy Statement/
Pospectus, supra note 33 at 11-14.
43 Daimler Holders Swap Old Shares, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1998, at C4.
Greg Ip and Gregory L. White, Big Board Is Hoping DaimlerChrysler Drives in More Foreign
Primary Shares, Wall St. J., Oct 21, 1998, at Cl.
45 See Jeffrey Ball, DaimlerChrysler Frets over Loss of U.S. Shareholders, Wall St. J., March 24,
199, at B4.
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These changes in ownership structure may trigger changes in corporate
governance because of both demand side factors (different shareholder
expectations) and supply side factors (banks become less willing to engage in
monitoring). The "inside" corporate governance mechanisms may become less
effective, requiring greater innovation in the direction of "outside" governance
mechanisms. 46 As the monitors change, the shareholder primacy norm is likely
to become more important. Faceless international institutional investors may be
less exposed to political and social pressure to balance shareholder interests
against those of other stakeholders than inside monitors, such as visibly German
banks.4 1 Moreover, maximizing for shareholders seems to be the common
denominator of the multinational firm.
Thus, the potential transmission vector for shareholder capitalism via the
DaimlerChrysler merger has a number of different determinants: the likelihood
of additional cross-border transactions; changing ownership patterns that in turn
trigger new governance needs and possibilities; and the possibly superior
performance of governance innovations in cross-border firms which increases the
pressure on other firms.
B.

The "Integration Committee"

The transaction planners of the DaimlerChrysler merger anticipated new
demand side and supply side governance pressures with a governance
innovation: a shareholders' advisory committee to consult with the Management
Board "in connection with the combined businesses and operation" of the
company. 4 This "Integration Committee" will consist primarily of the
shareholder representatives on the Supervisory Board and the two co-chairs. The
committee's name suggests that the initial impetus for its creation is to foster the
integration of the halves of the combined enterprise. There is also an
"Integration Council" in the office of the chairs that consists of senior
Management Board officers from Chrysler and Daimler with that explicit
purpose. Nevertheless, the Integration Committee is potentially a far-reaching
governance change, an effort to bring in American-style board monitoring of
managerial performance that avoids the limitations of the supervisory board.
There seems to be widespread agreement that the supervisory board is not a
very effective monitoring mechanism. 49 To some extent this flows from its
limited statutory role: although the supervisory board "shall supervise the
management of the company," it may not undertake "management
46 See, e.g., CalPERS, Global Corporate Governance Principles and German Market Principles
(http://calpers-governance.org/principles/international/global) (visited April 15, 1999).
41 On the other hand, non-German holders may find little political protection should vigorous
assertion of shareholder interests trigger a political backlash.
48 DC Proxy Statement/Prospectus, supra note 31 at 66.
49 See e.g., Roe, supra note 8 (citing to sources); Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance in
Germany-System and Current Developments, at 16 (University Osnabrick Institut fir Handels- und
Wirtschaftsrecht Working Paper No. 70, 1998).
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responsibilities." 50 Leading German commentators believe, however, that the
Stock Corporation Act grants ample power to the supervisory board to insist on
a truly supervisory relationship with the Management Board.5' The size of the
supervisory board is obviously a problem (typically twenty seats under the
statutory pattern for the largest firms), but the major impediments are not
statutorily prescribed: infrequent meetings (even after recent legislative reform,
only four meetings are required annually); and poor information flow
52
(guaranteed access to auditors' reports was granted only this year).
The hobbling of the supervisory board seems to derive from the German
system of co-determination, which guarantees 50% employee board
representation for the largest firms that are most likely to go public.5 3 Because of
beliefs that the employee representatives will use information about the firm in
distributional bargaining, management has restricted the information flow and the
decisonmaking potential of the supervisory board.4 There is a history of efforts
to evade codetermination, for example, by establishing supervisory board
committees that excluded employee representatives but that were vested with
some of the full board's power. This particular gambit has been rejected by the
German courts.55
This is the background that informs DaimlerChrysler's creation of an
Integration Committee. If the Committee is "advisory" only, if it merely
"consults" with the management board, if it doesn't exercise any of the
decisional authority of a supervisory board, then its activities will probably not
be regarded as derogating from codetermination. But even such an advisory
body could play a very important governance role. Most U.S. corporate activists
prize board representation not because of an explicit decisional role but for the
detailed information that a U.S. board receives, the right to ask hard questions at
the meeting (or in a private setting), and the opportunity to influence other
directors in evaluating managerial performance. Standing behind the Integration
Committee is the reality that its members constitute the voting majority of the
supervisory board, so a consensus formed privately on the basis of information
not distributed to the supervisory board could lead to supervisory board action.
To avoid the possibility of such visible conflict at a supervisory committee
meeting, especially where the outcome may be preordained, management may
well treat the Integration Committee as the "board" to which they are
accountable. If the DaimlerChrysler Integration Committee is successful both as
- § 111(1) AktG.
51 See Schmidt, supra note 6 at 109-11 (including citations).
52 See id.; Pistor, supra note 8 at 377.
53 For descriptions, see Baums, supra note 45; Herbert Wiedemann, Codetermination by Workers
in German Enterprises, 28 Am. J. Comp. L. 79 (1980); Klaus Hopt, Labor Representation on
Corproate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in
Europe, 14 Int'l Rev. L & Econ. 203 (1994).
5 See Roe, supra note 8; Schmidt, supra note 6; Pistor, supra note 8.
5 See Pistor, supra note 8 at 395-98 (establishing committees that are dominated by shareholder
representatives is permitted, but those that entirely exclude employee representatives are not
permitted).
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a matter of German law and as business practice, this could be a major
governance innovation. Any German public company could establish a
"consultative committee" consisting of outside shareholder representatives even
without a cross-border merger. This could become the standard for German firms
that wanted to commit themselves to the shareholder primacy norm for better
access to international capital markets.
C. The Flexibility of German Corporate Law
At least from an American perspective, German corporate law is surprisingly
open to shareholder initiative in the corporate governance area, even if the
pattern of German stock ownership thus far has rendered this governance
properly hypothetical. 56 In general a 5% shareholder (or group) has the right to
submit matters for shareholder vote at the annual meeting. 7 Indeed, a 5%
shareholder has the power to require management to call a special shareholders
meeting. 58 Additionally, where management has proposed a matter for
shareholder action, any shareholder, not just a 5% holder, may propose a
"countermotion" 59 that can, within the scope of a germaneness requirement,
trigger review and analysis of management's actions.
The scope of such shareholder initiative power is not entirely clear.6° The
shareholders are required annually to "ratify" acts of the supervisory board and
the management board; it may be possible, for example, to condition such
ratification upon the disclosure of information that would not otherwise be
disclosed. Shareholders also have the power to appoint auditors "for the
examination of matters in connection with . . . the management of the

company." This could serve as a general accountability device. Adoption of any
such shareholder proposal requires approval of a majority of shares represented
at the meeting.
56For a useful survey of the German law of shareholder rights, see Theodor Baums and Rainer
Schmitz, Shareholder Voting in Germany, University of Osnabruick Intitut ffir Handels- und
Wirtschaftsrecht (Working Paper No.76 1998).
57See § 122(2) AktG.
58 See § 122(1) AktG.
59See § 126 AktG..
60§ 119 AktG reads in relevant part:
(1) The shareholders' meeting shall resolve on matters expressly stated in this Act or the Articles, in
particular with respect to: 1. the election of [shareholder] members of the supervisory board ...
2. the appropriation of distributable profits;
3. the ratification of the acts of the members of the management board and the supervisory board;
4. the appointment of external auditors;
5. the amendment of the articles;
[... 1
7. the appointment of auditors for the examination of matters in connection with the formation or
management of the company;

(2) The shareholders' meeting may decide on matters concerning the management of the company
only if required by the management board.
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More importantly, shareholders have the power to propose amendments to the
articles of incorporation-in contrast to the U.S. pattern which requires prior
board approval before any articles amendment. An articles amendment requires
approval by a 75% shareholder vote. 6' Even if this supermajority requirement is
a significant barrier to adoption, the power to propose such amendments is quite
substantial, since management would presumably want to avoid the risk of
shareholder approval. The nature of legal constraints on the subject matter of
any such amendment is uncertain. The statute says that "the shareholders'
meeting may decide on matters concerning the management of the company
only if required by the management board." '62 But, an internal governance
change through the articles does not itself "concern management," even if it
may have implication for how the company is managed. The statute specifically
permits an articles amendment that would significantly change the relationship
between the supervisory board and the management board under a provision
"that specific types of transactions may be entered into only with the consent of
the supervisory board."' 63 The statutory provision could be read as an example of
the kind of permitted internal governance change via charter amendment, or,
cutting the other way (but less plausibly), as the exclusive form of such
amendment. 64
Moreover, the governance procedures of the management board itself are
directly regulable by the articles or through an articles provision that gives the
supervisory board power to promulgate bylaws for the management board. 65 For
example, it is clear that the articles can, vary the usual pattern of "joint"
management of the company by the management board. 66 Articles amendments
could affect decisionmaking and disclosure procedures of the managing board
and perhaps more substantive decisions as well.
All of these routes for shareholder initiative pose questions about the scope of
shareholder power that has been extensively litigated in U.S. state courts and in
the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) administrative practice under
the proxy rules' shareholder proposal rule. 67 The shifts in ownership patterns
See § 179 AktG.
62§ 119(2) AktG; see also § 76(1): "The management board shall have direct responsibility for
61

the management of the company."
63 § 111(4) AktG.
6 The general statutory provision on articles is not conclusive: "The articles may make different
provisions from the provisions of this Act only if this Act explicitly so permits. The articles may
contain additional provisions, except as to matters conclusively dealt with in this Act." § 23(5)
AktG.
6 See § 77(2) AktG.
66 See § 77(1) AktG, with the proviso that the articles may not reject the formal principle of
majority decisionmaking by the management board.
67 See Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] Rules, 17 CFR § 240.14a-8(c). On the
appropriate scope of shareholder initiative, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social
Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347 (1991) (limited
role for shareholder initiative under U.S. law in making of specific business decisions); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws, 19
Cardozo L. Rev. 511 (1997) (shareholder bylaw amendments as permissible residual governance
mechanism).
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could make these issues a very lively question in Germany. The German law
starts off in a direction more favorable to shareholders simply by recognizing the
shareholder power to amend the charter and the by-laws and to submit countermotions to management action.
Of particular interest from an American perspective are the rules regarding
circulation of these various shareholder initiatives in advance of the shareholder
meeting. The company is required to circulate the proposals (and any
justification presented for them) in a manner likely to reach the shareholder.68 In
the case of bearer shares deposited with a bank (the customary form of
ownership in Germany), the banks are responsible for contacting the beneficial
owners. For registered shareholders (adopted as the norm by DaimlerChrysler),
the company must send the material directly to the shareholder.
Finally, German law also gives shareholders the power to nominate candidates
for election to the supervisory board. Any shareholder can make such a
nomination, and the company is obliged to circulate the nomination to
shareholders, in the same way it is obligated to circulate other proposals.
Shareholders also have the power to remove management-side supervisory board
members without cause by a 75% vote (or a different percentage as set forth in
the articles). 69 This is particularly important because of the lengthy terms of
typical supervisory board members (almost five years) and the classification of
the board. As the U.S. experience illustrates, removal can be a powerful weapon
70
in a control contest.
1. Example: Executive Compensation
The potential of German corporate law to fashion a more robust governance
regime by shareholder action can be illustrated with the case of executive
compensation. Executive compensation, an important general concern of U.S.
shareholder activists over the past several years, may be of particular concern in
the German context. Top managers in Germany are paid considerably less than
their U.S. counterparts. This became an issue in the DaimlerChrysler merger
because the disparities were very large. For example, in the year before the
§ 125 AktG.
See § 103(1) AktG.
A potential additional factor facilitating shareholder activism is the help that U.S. securities

6s See
69
70

laws may provide in identifying all blockholders of the company. The German share ownership
disclosure rules are porous, and noncompliance is unlikely to elicit significantly penalty. See Marco
Becht and Ekkehard Boehmer, Transparency of Ownership and Control in Germany, in European
Corporate Governance Network, The Separation of Ownership and Control: A Survey of 7 European
Countries (1997) (web-posted at (http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.del - boehmer) (visited May 1, 1999).
Under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, a foreign issuer that lists securities on a U.S. exchange
must register under section 12(g) and becomes subject to section 13, which includes extensive
reporting requirements for 5% shareholders. Although the extraterritorial jurisdictional issues may be
uncertain, the stringent beneficial holder rules and disclosure requirements of Regulation 13D-G
should apply to DaimlerChrysler and its shareholders. Note that a foreign private issuer such as
DaimlerChrysler will be exempt from filings under section 14 (except when a tender offer is made)
and section 16 (short swing insider trading reporting and enforcement.) See 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, Rules 3a12-3(b), 3b-4.
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merger the Chrysler Chief Executive Officer (CEO) received cash compensation
of US $6 million and stock options worth US $5 million while the Daimler
CEO received approximately one-eighth of that amount. 71 DaimlerChrysler will
solve this culture-clash problem by adopting U.S. style compensation patterns
for senior management ranks. A significant part of the disparity derives from
prior legal restrictions on executive stock options in Germany. These legal
restrictions were substantially alleviated in the May 1, 1998, amendments to the
72
Stock Corporation Act, the Act on Control and Transparency of Enterprises.
73
Stock options are now permitted with shareholder approval.
German law does not require the kind of elaborate disclosure of executive
compensation found in the U.S. proxy regime. There is a limited disclosure
requirement in the German Commercial Law requiring annual disclosure of the
compensation paid to the managing board as a whole, not broken down by
individuals or by type of compensation. 74 Moreover, stock-linked compensation
may not be subject to such reporting.
To be sure, firms that issue stock options must obtain shareholder approval to
increase the number of authorized shares, and some disclosure will be made in
connection with the approval process.75 The scope of that disclosure is largely
within management's discretion (subject to the ability to obtain majority
shareholder approval). Moreover, its 1998 annual report filed pursuant to U.S.
securities laws indicates that DaimlerChrysler is shifting to a system of stock
appreciation rights (SARs) rather than stock option grants. 76 Since SARs are
settled in cash rather than in stock, it appears that shareholder approval is
unnecessary. Hence disclosure will occur under the U.S. disclosure regime rather
than the German corporate governance regime. Since foreign issuers are exempt
from proxy filings under the U.S. securities laws but not from the requirements
of periodic reporting,7 7 shareholders will know only the total number and terms
of executive stock options issued (or share-equivalents under a SAR system), not
allocations for particular executives. 78 Thus, at a time when the DaimlerChrysler
compensation scheme is substantially changing in management's favor,
shareholders may be left rather in the dark.
Circumstances are therefore ripe for a shareholder governance initiative
requiring more detailed disclosure of executive compensation than would
7' Gregory L. White and Brian Coleman, DaimlerChrysler Pay Scale to Lean Toward U.S., Wall
St. J., Aug. 7, 1998, at A3.
72 For a discussion see Baums, supra note 45, at 14-16.
73See § 192(l)(3) AktG.
74 See § 285 HGB.
15 See § 192(1) AktG. Even if there is already sufficient authorized but unissued stock,
shareholder approval is necessary to avoid preemptive rights. § 186(4). The company can also fulfill
an option contract through open market stock repurchases in certain circumstances.
76 DaimlerChrysler Form 20-F for FY 1998, 79-81 (filed with U.S. Securities Exchange
Commission, March 31, 1999).
77 See discussion supra note 70.
78 Indeed, the 1998 DaimlerChrysler Form 20-F reports only aggregate compensation and pension
benefits for Supervisory Board and Management Board members, Euro 43 million and Euro 24
million, respectively. DaimlerChrysler 1998 Form 20-F, supra note 76, at 79.
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otherwise be required under German corporate law. There seem to be at least
three mechanisms for this: (1) a countermotion at an annual meeting, tying
shareholder ratification of the acts of the management board and supervisory
board to such disclosure;7 9 (2) a motion calling for the appointment of auditors
to investigate and report on executive compensation matters; 80 or (3) an articles
amendment on executive compensation disclosure. The first two strategies have
the advantage of a lower approval threshold (50% compared to 75%), but the
articles amendment can more readily establish a durable pattern that becomes
integrated into management decisionmaking on executive compensation. It
should also be possible through articles amendment to establish a compensation
committee of the supervisory board with specific responsibility to review
executive compensation, but this should not substitute for a disclosure regime.
Thus, executive compensation disclosure could be a precedent-establishing
case of German corporate governance reform through shareholder initiative. It
may be possible to replicate the U.S. mandatory disclosure system of executive
compensation via self-help. The issue appeals both to American and German
investors in DaimlerChrysler. Executive compensation has been a particular
focus of American institutional investors, and any change in the traditional
German pattern is likely to worry many Germans for social as well as economic
reasons. 8 The comparatively modest stock option plans that have been
implemented under the previous, more cumbersome German rules have drawn
fire from shareholder activists (although they still receive high levels of
shareholder support), 2 The potential for high-powered American style executive
compensation raises even more significant questions for shareholder reflection. 3
In the same way that the DaimlerChrysler merger created a template for crossborder acquisitions in Germany, a shareholder initiative on executive
compensation disclosure could set the template for self-help governance reform
See § 119(1)(3) AktG.
80 See § 119(1)(7) AktG.
81 In 1996 Daimler introduced a stock option scheme under the prior more cumbersome legal
79

regime. Although the company's works councils supported the plan, all but one employee
representative to the supervisory board opposed it, from concern that executives would sacrifice jobs
in favor of an increased share price. See Mary O'Sullivan, The Political Economy of Corporate
Governance in Germany, at 40 (Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 226, Feb.
1998).
82 See Ekkehard Wenger and Christoph Kaserer, German Banks and Corporate Governance-A
Critical View, in Hopt et al, supra note 7, at 499.
83 The desirability of disclosure aside, the preferred normative position may not be so obvious.
Over the long run, maintaining separate wage scales for "Chrysler" and "Daimler" executives will
be difficult and would interfere with integration of the operations of the combined firms. How could
Management Board members with responsibility for equally important and complex business
activities receive dramatically different compensation levels? It probably is in the interests of
shareholders to equalize executive pay scales, and if access to the American market in automobile
executives is important, the optimal equalization point may be in the American direction rather than
the German.
From a broader perspective, the concern about stock options is that they too effectively align the
interests of managers and shareholders; that they are part of a system of shareholder capitalism
inconsistent with traditional German stakeholder concerns.
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on other issues-in DaimlerChrysler and in other publicly traded German firms.
Moreover, a governance precedent set for DaimlerChrysler, Germany's largest
industrial corporation, may be hard to resist in other German firms, particularly
those that look to international capital markets. When the DaimlerChrysler
merger was announced, Germans celebrated the fact that although the storied
"Benz" name disappeared, "Dainler" was preeminent and the new entity was a
German corporation. German shareholders may be pleasantly surprised to
discover the German takeover of a U.S. corporation may lead to a U.S. (partial)
takeover of German corporate law-or at least an infusion of U.S. style scrutiny
of managerial behavior and pressure to promote shareholder value. Daimler
management, on the other hand, may be surprised to learn that they captured a
Trojan horse.
IV. IS SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM SUSTAINABLE?
The Deutsche Telekom privatization and the DaimlerChrysler merger are
different steps on the road to shareholder capitalism. The contrasts, even
inconsistencies, between the two transactions reveal an ambivalence about the
model of shareholder capitalism that Germany may wish to embrace. The
Deutsche Telekom transaction was literally about creating a "shareholder
culture," the idea that ordinary citizens could own stock and buy stock from an
initial public offering. Such a cultural change was to make equity capital
markets deeper and open the way for alternative financing opportunities for
newly emerging German firms. But the structure of the transaction reflects the
probably unattainable desire to have a "shareholder culture" without a robust
'form of shareholder capitalism. This approach may be possible in limited market
segments, especially where the government in a sense guarantees profitability,
but it does not provide a general basis for large scale public offerings.
"Shareholder capitalism" goes much deeper, however. It means managing the
firm in the interests of shareholders and gives rise to governance mechanism that
will limit the extent that managers can deviate from a shareholder primacy
norm. How desirable is this? What does it ultimately entail in terms of the
interests of stakeholders such as employees?
Seen from an economic perspective, the goal of a system of corporate
governance is to maximize the economic value of the firm, as measured by the
total of economic returns for all possible residual claimants. For instance, the
goal is to maximize the sum of the returns for shareholders, debt claimants, and
workers. The ultimate defense of the assignment in the Anglo-American system
of exclusive governance rights to the stockholders rests on the empirically
contestable fact that this is how you maximize the size of the economic pie.
For a long time the German experience suggested that the Anglo-American
system was not necessarily the best approach. While returns to equity investment
in German firms have been significantly lower than in the U.S. over the last 15
years, increases in labor productivity have been significantly higher (twice as
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much).8 4 Although precise comparisons of the sum of the returns are
quantitatively difficult, there is much to suggest equivalence. The growth rate of
per capita GDP in Germany exceeded the U.S. growth rate over a forty year
period, to the point of GDP equality in absolute terms.85 Now, however, at least
some believe that significant gains depend upon a different economic culture of
entrepreneurial risk-taking induced by high-powered incentives like the equity
rewards under a regime of shareholder wealth maximization.8 6 The equity-raising
potential revealed in the widespread public acquisition of Telekom shares and
the important governance innovations that may be latent in the DaimlerChrysler
merger suggests an important transitional moment in a debate about corporate
objectives.
These problems arise most acutely because of the deep problem of adjusting
to a sharply changing competitive environment in a "new economic order"
characterized by flexible global markets in products, capital, and labor.87
Governments can pursue different strategies in addressing the transition costs of
capitalism. 8 One possibility is a protectivist strategy that seeks to impede the
transition in question through trade barriers, for example, or capital market
controls. 89 Another is a frankly transitional strategy, that looks to measures such
as grandfathering, retraining, and incentives for early retirement. 90 A third is
simply to let the costs fall where they may, subject to background conditions of
social insurance. 91
Germany has followed a mixed strategy.92 Against the framework of a national
bargaining structure, particular firms and unions have negotiated custom-tailored
packages on wages and on layoffs. Indeed, more recently large firms have spun
off and even closed down money-losing units. 93 The government has funded
84 See Le Ddfi Americain, Again, Economist, 21 (July 13, 1996). For example, the average return
on equity for German firms in 1994 was 7.4%, half the average return for U.S. firms; the return on
capital for German firms between 1974-1993 was only 7%, compared with 9% in the U.S. But
average labor productivity in German firms increased at an annual 1.8% since 1979, twice the
American rate. See also Desperately Seeking a Perfect Model, Economist 67 (April 10, 1999) (per
capita GDP growth 1989-99 is higher in Germany than in the U.S.; same for average annual
productivity growth).
85 Stakeholder Capitalism--Unhappy Families, 23, 24 Economist (Feb. 10, 1996).
86 Id., at 25.
87 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pension Funds, and the New Economic Order 97 Colum. L.
Rev. 1519 (1997).
88 See generally, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership as a Transitional Device: The
Case of the Airline Industry, in Handbook of Airline Economics 575, 576 (Darryl Jenkins ed., 1995).
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See Mary O'Sullivan, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Germany (Jerome
Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 226 (Feb. 1998) (summarizing and collecting sources);
see also David Charny, Workers and Corporate Governance: The Role of Political Culture, in
Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe, Employees' Role in Corporate Governance (Brookings,
forthcoming 1999).
93 See Edmund L. Andrews, German Giants Spinning Off Big Businesses, NY Times, Nov. 17,
1998, at C6 (discussing Siemens, VIAG, Metro, Daimler, VEBA, and Hoechst).
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early retirement schemes of various sorts. Nevertheless, many observers believe
that labor productivity issues account for high current unemployment levels and
that addressing these problems, particularly through the reorganization of the
workplace, offers significant opportunities for enhancement of shareholder
value. 94 The question is whether a robust version of shareholder capitalism is
possibly the vehicle for a realignment of political economy. Another way to put
the question is to ask whether governance innovations that, in the name of
shareholder primacy, lead to significant restructurings are politically sustainable.
The uncertainty about the politically acceptable level of shareholder capitalism
in Germany is illustrated by the failed hostile takeover attempt of Thyssen AG
by Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp ("Krupp") in the spring of 1997 and the
eventual combination of the two companies. Massive labor and political
opposition, rather than managerialist manipulation of a failed corporate
governance system, was the key barrier to the hostile bid and shaped the
eventual merger.95 Krupp initiated the struggle with a cash tender offer to
Thyssen shareholders at a 25% market *premium. Thyssen management, of
course, objected (particularly to the conflicting role of Deutsche Bank whose
investment banking subsidiary advised Krupp, while one of the Bank's
management board members sat on the Thyssen supervisory board). The most
effective resistance, however, was waged by the union leadership, goaded in part
by the Thyssen CEO's assertions that the takeover would lead to heavy layoffs
(at a time of 11% unemployment). Labeling the hostile bid as a "Wild West"
tactic, the union leadership organized demonstrations of as many as 30,000
workers, and particularly focused them against Deutsche Bank-a politically
vulnerable target. In response to the ensuing political pressure, Krupp called off
the hostile bid. Eventually, the firms entered into a "friendly" merger, brokered
in part by political leaders, in two stages. First, a consolidation of their steel
operations, and then an overall merger of the two firms. But the critical element
in putting together these transactions was reducing the level of job loss, not
maximizing the value to shareholders.
The DaimlerChrysler transaction, therefore, may potentiate a kind of
shareholder capitalism in Germany but there may also be limits. In a system
previously established on an "insider governance" model, it may seem a natural
evolutionary step to give institutional investors a place at the bargaining table to
argue for shareholder value. In this regard, the efforts to make use of self-help
possibilities of the German Stock Corporation Act for greater disclosure and
accountability seem sustainable. More radical developments, in which
institutional engagement energizes control entrepreneurs with far-reaching
restructuring plans, pose a much greater threat to the established model of
94 For example, Chrysler has engineered a very efficient production process that uses a quarter of
the worker hours on a per car basis than Daimler requires.
91 The account here is based on press reports, especially the European Wall Street Journal. See
Matt Marshall, Thyssen, Krupp Opt for 2 CEOs, Removing Barriers in Merger Talks, Wall St. J.
(Europe), Jan. 12, 1998, at 3; Thomas Kamm and Matt Marshall, The Next Wave: Global Forces
Push European Companies into Merger Frenzy, Wall St. J. (Europe), April 4, 1997, at 1; Kristi
Bahrenburg, Takeover Flop Dims German Shares' Sheen, Wall St. J. (Europe), Apr. 2, 1997, at 12.
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political economy. This version of shareholder capitalism may not be politically
sustainable, and if not sustainable, then the case for convergence in governance
regimes becomes much harder.

